“I signed the “pacing letter” about slowing the rate of AI capabilities development because we either have reached or soon will reach the point where human experts cannot make robust assurances that frontier AI systems won’t do dangerous and unpredictable things.”
Dean W. Ball · September 10, 2026
Title and organization are as of the date said.
In context
“I signed the “pacing letter” about slowing the rate of AI capabilities development because we either have reached or soon will reach the point where human experts cannot make robust assurances that frontier AI systems won’t do dangerous and unpredictable things.” AI systems are becoming smarter than the best humans in some areas, and, almost by definition, it’s very hard to predict what something smarter than you will do.
Source
- https://x.com/deanwball/status/2098069548893352078 · X (tweet)
- Content captured 2026-11-07, SHA-256 61991d7e8b0cbcdd63266616152bba1e0e06a2972af9e521635a77d6a7b20025
Cite this quote
Ball, D. W. (2026, September 10). I signed the “pacing letter” about slowing the rate of AI capabilities development because we either have reached or soon… [Post]. X. https://x.com/deanwball/status/2098069548893352078
More from Dean W. Ball
“I am more optimistic than this. I think it’s primarily a science problem, and that it’s possible to make progress in that science. But no, while there is engineering we can do today to improve AI safety, it is not fundamentally an engineering problem.”
Dean W. Ball · September 28, 2026
“Some people will look at misalignment incidents and insist that these are akin to bugs in traditional software. This is an actively bad analogy, because playing whack-a-mole with examples of misalignment (as one might with software bugs) not only fails to resolve the underlying problem but may in fact make it *worse* by making it harder to detect or even, depending on how you do the whack-a-mole, teach the machine to deliberately hide misalignment.”
Dean W. Ball · September 28, 2026
“Pacing the frontier would make open-weight models more competitive with the closed frontier, not less. The labs aren’t doing this because we are scared of open-weight.”
Dean W. Ball · September 12, 2026
Others on the same topic
“If we achieve ASI within 6-12 months, I estimate that the chance of an AI takeover is roughly 75%. (In a recent talk, Paul Christiano said it would be a coin flip.) Paired with the timelines above, unless we achieve aggressive pacing or a pause within 6-12 months, we incur something like a 1-in-4 to 1-in-3 chance of AI takeover within 12 months.”
Nikola Jurkovic, Member of Technical Staff, METR · November 13, 2026
Stated probability: ~75% AI takeover if ASI within 6-12 months; 1-in-4 to 1-in-3 chance of AI takeover within 12 months absent pacing/pause
“It is very important to build capacity for a coordinated slowdown of AI development. A runaway race to AGI is not safe: it creates incentives to cut corners on safety, and carries a substantial risk for model capabilities to outpace development of adequate alignment, control, and governance measures. This could result in catastrophic loss of control of highly capable AI systems.”
Victoria Krakovna, Research Scientist, Google DeepMind · September 11, 2026
“Safety progress takes time. If you don’t have enough time, at each stage of AI development, to ensure the AIs that you build in the next stage won’t destroy humanity, then you’ll fail, and humanity will be destroyed. Automated alignment research helps a lot here, and that’s a core reason I think it’s so important (human alignment researchers are too scarce and slow). But even if AIs are doing most or all of the alignment work, it still matters how much time they have.”
Joe Carlsmith · March 19, 2026